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SURROGACY AND THE ECtHR: REFLECTIONS ON 
 PARADISO AND CAMPANELLI v ITALY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This case note analyses the recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy and examines its implications for cross-border surrogacy in 
Europe. It is argued that this judgment is highly significant, because it sets new standards in 
terms of the concept of family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This judgment, it is argued, only appears to bring a halt to the (seemingly) backdoor 
legitimacy of commercial surrogacy established by the findings of the Second Section and 
previous judgments of the Court. Finally, this case note critiques the Grand Chamber’s 
findings and examines its likely impact on the problem of cross-border surrogacy.   
KEYWORDS: Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of 
Human Rights, Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, surrogacy. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Surrogacy has generated a significant amount of controversy in academic and policy circles 
but cross-border surrogacy, which is related to reproductive tourism, has brought the issue 
into the international arena. Over the last few years the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter ECtHR or Court) has been called upon to interpret Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention) on family and private life to provide 
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protection to children and their intended parents.1 The latest case, the decision of the Grand 
Chamber in Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (the Paradiso case) was issued in January 2017.2   
This case note will analyse the Paradiso case and examine its likely implications for 
cross-border surrogacy in Europe. After summarising the facts and judgments, it will be 
argued that the Grand Chamber decision sets new standards for the interpretation of family 
life and surrogacy. Special focus will be given to another fundamental part of this judgment: 
the finding that there was no violation of the right to respect for private life caused by the 
removal of the child from the intended parents. This note will then indicate that the judgment 
appears to bring a halt to the (seemingly) backdoor legitimacy of commercial surrogacy 
established by the previous case law of the Court, but does not offer a solution to cross-
border surrogacy. 
 
PARADISO AND CAMPANELLI v ITALY: AN OVERVIEW 
In 2010 Mrs Paradiso and Mr Campanelli entered into a surrogacy agreement with a Russian 
clinic given that surrogacy is not legal in Italy. Mrs Paradiso took a sample of her husband’s 
semen to Russia so that it could be joined with a donor’s egg and implanted into a surrogate’s 
womb. The Russian clinic certified that Mr Campanelli’s semen was used for the creation of 
the implanted embryos, which was however proved wrong by a later DNA test.  
The child was born in Moscow in February 2011, and Mrs Paradiso submitted the 
necessary documents to the Italian Consulate in Russia and took the child to Italy that April. 
In May 2011 the Italian Consulate informed the relevant Italian authorities that the birth 
certificate contained false information. Consequently, the Italian Public Prosecutor started 
criminal proceedings against the couple for misrepresentation of civil status, use of falsified 
                                                            
1 e.g. Mennesson v France [2014] ECHR 664 and Labassee v France [2014] ECHR 668. 
2 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy [2017] ECHR 96. 
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documents and breach of the international adoption rules of Italy. At the same time, civil 
proceedings were instigated to suspend the couple’s custody and place the child for adoption, 
as it was in a ‘state of abandonment’.3 Following the appointment of a guardian, the 
registration of the Russian birth certificate was refused. In proceedings before the civil courts 
in Italy, a team of social workers drafted a report on the family, indicating that the intended 
parents had a comfortable income, were respected by their fellow citizens and the child was 
in excellent health. However, in August 2011 a DNA test proved that the child bore no 
biological link to Mr Campanelli. 
In October 2011 the child was removed from the intended parents and was placed in a 
children’s home for fifteen months, before ending up in a new family. The separation was 
ordered by the Campobasso Minors Court while the proceedings were pending, and was 
contrary to the advice of a consulted psychologist who warned about the devastating effects 
of a possible separation on the child. The whole process was conducted under strict 
anonymity so the intended parents lost trace of the child. 
The Chamber of the ECtHR held that, based on the time the applicants had parented 
the child during the important first stages of his young life, there was a de facto family life 
within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR. It did not matter that there was no formal legal 
relationship with the child. The right to respect for private life was also involved, given that it 
encompasses the right to establish relationships with others and here there was a direct link 
between the establishment of paternity and Mr Campanelli’s private life. The Chamber held 
that the removal of the child without any specific assessment regarding his best interests was 
                                                            
3 According to section 8 of (the Italian) Law no. 184/1983 (‘the Adoption Act’), as amended by Law no. 149 of 
2001, entitled ‘The Child’s Right to a Family’, a child is encountered in a state of abandonment when it is being 
deprived of all emotional or material support from the parents or the members of his or her family responsible 
for providing such support other than in temporary cases of force majeure (n 2 [63]). 
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an extreme measure that should be used only as a last resort and, consequently, the national 
authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest and the private 
interests.4  
The academic reaction to the judgment was mixed. Beaumont and Trimmings were 
among those who urged the Court to reconsider the notion of de facto family life, given that 
the child had resided with the intended parents for only eight months and bore no genetic link 
to the couple.5 With its referral to the Grand Chamber, the case took an interesting turn, as the 
ECtHR based, among others, on the two factors mentioned by Beaumont and Trimmings did 
not consider that family life was engaged in the present case.  
 
FAMILY LIFE 
A quick glance at the case law of the ECtHR reveals that the concept of family life is rather 
wide. The Court has repeatedly stated that the application of the notion of family life is not 
conditional upon a merely legal and formal relationship, but upon the real existence of family 
ties, otherwise referred to as de facto family ties.6 Nonetheless, the desire to found a family or 
adopt is not guaranteed by Article 8.7     
The Grand Chamber rejected the application of the concept of family life in the 
Paradiso case on three grounds: the absence of biological ties, the short duration of their 
                                                            
4 Chamber’s Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy, [86]. 
5 P Beaumont and K Trimmings, ‘Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the Area of 
Cross-Border Surrogacy: Is There Still a Need for Global Regulation of Surrogacy?’ (University of Aberdeen, 
Working Paper no. 2016/4), <https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL_2016-4.pdf> accessed 22 
December 2017. 
6 e.g. Johnston and Others v Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203. 
7 E.B. v France [2007] ECHR 211. 
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cohabitation and the uncertainty of the ties from a legal perspective based on their own 
actions. 
i) Absence of biological ties 
The absence of biological ties alone does not preclude the notion of family life as the ECtHR 
itself acknowledges that family life exists as long as there are genuine personal ties. In fact, 
this is one of the reasons for the recognition of de facto family ties by the ECtHR: to provide 
protection for genuine personal ties in circumstances where there is no biological link 
between an adult and a child; the other reason being the absence of recognised legal ties.8 
Therefore, the Court acknowledges the fact that biological ties are not a sine qua non for the 
notion of family life and further accepts that the applicants had developed a parental project 
and had undertaken the role of parents towards the child. In this way, the intended parents 
created an emotional bond with the child from his early life, which was also recognised by 
the social workers report before the Italian Minors Court civil proceedings.9 Despite the 
above findings, this criterion in combination with the duration of cohabitation leads to a 
different result.  
ii) Duration of cohabitation 
The Grand Chamber held that there should be no specification of a minimal duration of 
cohabitation between the parents and child to develop de facto family ties. Nonetheless, the 
time of cohabitation is a crucial element when acknowledging the reality of a family life. The 
Court considered that although there have been cases where the time of shared life lasted for 
only two months, in those cases there was a biological tie with at least one parent and the 
cohabitation was subsequently resumed.10 Given that in the present case the parents had spent 
                                                            
8 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (n 2) [141]. 
9 ibid [151]. 
10 D. and Others v Belgium ECtHR 8 July 2014, [49]. 
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‘only’ eight months with the child and there was no biological link between them, the 
criterion of cohabitation was not fulfilled. In addition, the belief that the intended father was 
the biological parent could not compensate for the short period of the cohabitation.  
iii)  Uncertainty created by the applicants themselves 
The Grand Chamber refused to accept the existence of de facto family life because the 
applicants put themselves in this situation of legal uncertainty by acting in a way that was 
illegal and inconsistent with their state’s legal system. In Italy surrogacy is prohibited and the 
settlement of the intended parents with the child lacked any legal basis.  
This judgment introduces new elements to the notion of family life. The duration of 
cohabitation is made a key element for de facto family ties, an element that has been used in 
previous judgments to support the existence of family life, although it has been held by the 
Court that it ‘does not see cohabitation as a sine qua non of family life between parents and 
minor children’.11 Nevertheless, its duration has never been a subject of scrutiny. According 
to this new judgment, a short time of cohabitation does not suffice for the notion of family 
ties when there is no biological link between the parents and the child, such as eight months 
for instance. This is not the case when there is a biological tie, as in such cases the duration of 
cohabitation may be as short as two months. It is however important to keep in mind the fact 
that there is no definition of the period that constitutes a short duration of cohabitation. This 
leads to the conclusion that the issue of cohabitation will be decided by the Court on a case-
by-case basis. It is curious that, previously, in the absence of a biological link in Moretti and 
Benedetti v Italy 19 months were considered enough to establish de facto family ties between 
foster parents and the child.12  
                                                            
11 Berrehab v Netherlands ECtHR 21 June 1988, [21]. 
12 Moretti and Benedetti v Italy ECtHR 27 Apr 2010. 
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Additionally, the Paradiso case gives rise to the presumption that belief in the 
existence of a biological connection with the child does not counterbalance the short time of 
cohabitation. Accordingly, the belief of genetic parenthood does not automatically imply the 
existence of de facto family ties where there is a short duration of shared life. This is an 
important point to note as, previously, there was an affirmation regarding a different scenario: 
the belief of genetic parenthood supports a finding of de facto family ties where the duration 
of shared life is long.13  
Finally, the legal uncertainty regarding the family ties between the applicants and the 
child based on their own previous acts constitutes a reason for rejecting family life. In 
situations like this the requirements for a de facto family life are not met. Again, this is 
contrary to the previous case law of the Court providing protection to family ties based on an 
illegal – in the home country – adoption. In Wagner v Luxembourg,14 protection was granted 
to an adoption carried out under Peruvian law which was contradictory to the laws of 
Luxembourg, a comparison easily drawn with the present case involving a legal surrogacy in 
Russia that was illegal in the country of origin: Italy.  
To summarise, the combination of these three factors played a catalytic role in the 
interpretation of family life by the ECtHR. It seems the Court would have reached a different 
conclusion in the absence of any of these circumstances. The three factors – namely, absence 
of biological ties, short duration of cohabitation and the legal uncertainty created by the 
applicants themselves – led to the Court’s refusal to apply Article 8 in terms of family life. 
Nonetheless, the judgment serves as a landmark decision for surrogacy and introduces 
important changes to family life. 
 
                                                            
13 Nazarenko v Russia [2015] ECHR 686, [58]. 
14 Wagner and J.M.W.L. v Luxembourg ECtHR 28 June 2007. 
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LEGITIMATE INTERFERENCE 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR accepted that the state’s actions constituted an interference with 
private life based on the removal of the child and its placement under guardianship and 
adoption. The relationship between the adults and child, even in the absence of biological or 
legal ties, and the desire of the couple to become parents evoked the notion of private life; as 
did Mr Campanelli’s intent to demonstrate a biological link with the child. Article 8, 
however, constitutes a qualified right which entails a balance between the rights of the 
individual and the broader interests of society. Accordingly, the next issue to address is 
whether there has been a legitimate interference with the applicants’ private life. The Grand 
Chamber examined the issues discussed below when considering the legitimate interference 
of Italy in the private life of the applicants: 
i) In accordance with the law 
This condition goes beyond the impugned measures being based on national law, as it 
additionally requires that the national law in question be both accessible to the person 
concerned and have foreseeable effects. The Grand Chamber assumed that this was the case 
for the legal parent-child relationship, since the application of Italian law on the conflict of 
laws is justified as both biological parents are unknown donors. According to the (Italian) 
Private International Law Act, the establishment of parentage is governed by the national law 
regulating the child at the time of its birth, therefore the status of the child (as of unknown 
nationality) was equivalent to that of a foreign minor, making the application of Italian law 
and the child’s ‘state of abandonment’ foreseeable. Regarding the birth certificate, The Hague 
 9 
 
Convention only applies when confirming the authenticity of the signature, but does not 
apply when verifying the truthfulness of its content.15 
ii)  Legitimate aim 
There must be a legitimate aim justifying state interference with the applicants’ private life. 
The Grand Chamber accepted that the actions taken by the Italian authorities were measures 
aimed at preventing disorder and protecting the child’s rights and freedoms, as the state 
wished to ‘reaffirm its exclusive competence to recognise a legal parent-child relationship – 
and this solely in the case of a biological tie or lawful adoption – with a view to protecting 
children’.16  
iii) Necessity in a democratic society 
This condition has been shaped by the Court as a classic test concerning state interference in 
terms of Article 8 of the ECHR. It includes an estimation of whether the interference is in 
accordance with the margin of appreciation doctrine, whether the reasons for it are relevant 
and sufficient and whether the intervention respects the principle of proportionality. 
A margin of appreciation is granted to states as it is presumed that, in principle, they 
are better suited to assessing their internal matters.17 The scope of the deference shown to 
states depends on many factors. When a particularly important facet of one’s identity is at 
stake, then the margin of appreciation should be restricted.18 Conversely, when there is no 
consensus in Europe about an issue or if it raises issues concerning sensitive moral or ethical 
                                                            
15 The Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public 
Documents. 
16 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (n 2) [177]. 
17 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20, [62]. 
18 Evans v UK (2008) 43 EHRR 21, [77]. 
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dilemmas, the margin of appreciation will be broad.19 In the Paradiso case the breadth of the 
deference was wide, because of the sensitive issues of a moral and ethical nature. 
Furthermore, the Court had previously identified a lack of European consensus on the matter 
of surrogacy among the Contracting States of the Convention.20 The ECtHR drew a 
distinction between the Paradiso case and Mennesson, as in the case at hand the applicants 
did not represent the child and there is no biological link between them. Nevertheless, even 
when the margin of appreciation is broad there must be a fair balance struck between the 
competing interests.  
The Court observed that the rationale for the measures taken by the Italian authorities 
was both relevant and sufficient. The justification for these measures rested on the fact that 
the illegality of the intended parents’ behaviour and the urgency of acting to protect the child 
(who was deemed to be in a ‘state of abandonment’) were directly connected to the legitimate 
aim pursued: preventing disorder and protection of children in general by establishing 
parentage via adoption and prohibition of medically assisted reproduction. 
Finally, when evaluating proportionality it is essential to examine whether the Italian 
authorities struck a fair balance between the interests of the individuals and the interests of 
society.21 The interests put forward by the Italian courts are ‘very weighty public interests’,22 
as is putting an end to an illegal situation. In addition, the measures serve to protect women 
and children from the dangers that surrogacy can evoke, such as human trafficking. At the 
other end of the spectrum – ie the individual interests – the authorities attached significant 
                                                            
19 Mennesson v France (n 1) [77]. 
20 ibid [78]. 
21 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (n 2) [200]. 
22 ibid [204]. 
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weight to the interests of the child and the need for adoption by suitable parents, given the 
absence of biological links. Furthermore, the Court estimated that the separation would not 
cause irreparable damage to the child. In relation to the applicants’ interests, the national 
courts considered their interest to carry little weight, as the judges were not obliged to give 
priority to the preservation of the relationship between the applicants and child. The 
justification for the low weighting given to the applicants’ interests was again the unlawful 
situation created by the applicants themselves. Consequently, the ECtHR held that a fair 
balance was struck between the interests of the individuals and those of society, while it 
rejected the arguments of the applicants about shortcomings regarding the failure to follow 
the expert’s opinion and to find alternatives to the immediate and irreversible separation. The 
ECtHR rejected these arguments by referring to the expertise of the Italian Minors Court and 
the fact that the Italian authorities had to act rapidly given the risk of the passage of time 
determining the outcome of the case.     
 
CRITICISM AND IMPACT OF THE JUDGMENT 
This case note argues that the separation of the intended parents from the child, as ordered by 
the Italian courts, is an extremely regrettable situation. Surrogacy entails considerable risks 
and challenges. Nonetheless, the failure of the Grand Chamber to protect the individuals’ 
respect for private and family life can be criticised on many grounds. 
With reference to the interpretation of family life made by the ECtHR in this specific 
case, it should be observed that the Court seems to treat the Paradiso Campanelli family as an 
illegitimate family as it constantly emphasised that their uncertainty was self-inflicted. Using 
the uncertainty of parentage to deny the existence of de facto family life creates the 
impression that the Court makes a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate families and 
‘labels’ this family illegitimate. Again, it should be kept in mind that surrogacy was legal in 
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Russia, it is not as if the intended parents kidnapped the child and brought it from Russia to 
Italy. This case bears a resemblance to the Wagner case discussed above in which the 
adoption was legally performed in Peru, but was illegal under Luxembourgian law. The fact 
that the Paradiso Campanelli family was portraited as an illegitimate family was similarly 
emphasised by the Joint Dissenting Opinion.23 
This criticism is connected to the well-established jurisprudence of the Court that the 
notion of family life does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate families.24 The 
extent of this disaccord with the previous case law is evidenced by the Joint Concurring 
Opinion of Judges De Gaetano, Pinto de Albuquerque, Wojtyczek and Dedov, which notes 
that ‘a family is to be understood a natural and fundamental group unit of society, founded 
primarily by the marriage between a man and a woman’.25 Although this notion of family was 
not adopted by the majority of the Court, it constitutes a very dangerous approach erasing all 
the progress the Court has made towards a more equal, diverse and less discriminatory 
society both in terms of married versus non-married couples and heterosexual versus 
homosexual couples.26 
Although the ECtHR does not formally confer precedence to its own judgments, it 
does hold the principles of legal certainty, predictability and foreseeability in high regard and 
                                                            
23 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (n 2) Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Lazarova, Trajkovska, Bianku, 
Laffranque, Lemmens and Grozev, [3]-[4]. 
24 Among others, Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330, Kroon and Others v Netherlands (1995) 19 EHRR 
263. 
25 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy (n 2) Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges De Gaetano, Pinto de Albuquerque, 
Wojtyczek and Dedov, [3]. 
26 Among others, Mata Estevez v Spain [2001] ECHR 896, S.H. and Others v Austria ECtHR 3 Nov 2011, 
Vallianatos and Others v Greece [2013] ECHR 1110, Oliari and Others v Italy [2015] ECHR 716. 
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consequently only changes its jurisprudence when presented with compelling reasons.27 In 
the Paradiso case, it is not apparent why the Court has taken what could be construed as a 
retrogressive step by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate families. If it does 
have compelling reasons, these should have been clearly articulated throughout its judgment, 
which was not the case.28 It is important to remember that the concept examined is de facto 
family life, and that its involvement does not necessarily mean illegitimate interference with 
Article 8. 
Furthermore, the Court’s close and narrow interpretation of family life can be 
construed as limiting the protection of genuine family ties. This approach runs the risk of 
rendering the application of de facto family ties to some surrogacy situations obsolete. Using 
a strict definition of family life may discourage couples from engaging in cross-border 
surrogacy, but it also leaves unprotected people that undergo surrogacy with the belief that it 
was their genetic material used for the embryos implanted in the surrogate mother’s uterus. 
This means that when the genetic material of one of the parents is used for the embryos 
implanted in the surrogate mother the protection will be granted to the intended parents, 
hence not discouraging them from engaging in surrogacy. On the other hand, if the intended 
parents believe it was their genetic material that was used for the creation of the embryos but 
due to an error in the clinic this did not occur, they are left unprotected. It is not difficult to 
see the arbitrariness of this approach, as it allows the claims of biological parents but denies 
those of non-biological parents where there is fraud or negligence on the clinic’s part. 
                                                            
27 Cossey v UK ECtHR 27 Sept 1990, [35]. See further, SD Pattinson, ‘The Human Rights Act and the Doctrine 
of Precedent’ (2015) 35 LS 142, 147-148. 
28 The ECtHR makes a reference to the danger of human trafficking through surrogacy at [202], however it does 
not build on that argument and does not make any moral or ethical assessment that would justify this change in 
its case law. 
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This strict and narrow interpretation of de facto family ties taken by the Court in 
Paradiso clashes with previous case law, which had focussed on the bond between the people 
involved. The ECtHR does not justify measuring cohabitation only in terms of duration.29 
Focusing on the emotional bond and that the parents behaved as such in every aspect towards 
the child could have led to recognition of de facto family ties for the Paradiso Campanelli 
family.  
Objections can also be raised about the Court’s evaluation of the legitimate 
interference with private life. The efficacy of the measures taken to achieve the legitimate 
aim of protecting the child can be called into question. The social workers’ report showed 
that there was no danger for the child living with the intended parents; in contrast, the child 
was in a loving environment. In addition, the report of the psychologist about the irreparable 
damage of the separation to the child puts into doubt whether the measures taken pursued the 
best interests of the child, which is a primary consideration.30 It is hard to see how the 
separation served the best interests of the child. It should be highlighted that in the Paradiso 
case, the child was not an applicant, however the argument that the separation served the best 
interests of the child was used to justify the state’s interference. Nonetheless, in the light of 
the lack of consideration given to the best interests of the child the use of legitimate 
interference is flimsy. It is additionally contrary to the Court’s case law, according to which 
                                                            
29 For instance, Nazarenko v Russia (n 13) [56]. 
30 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 3(1). The ECtHR included it in its ‘Relevant International 
Law and Practice’ section of the judgment, [76].  
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the interests of the child remain paramount even in cases of fraudulent or misleading 
evidence.31  
Regarding proportionality, as the Chamber had correctly pointed out, the separation of 
the child from its parents should be an extreme measure to be used as a last resort to protect 
the child from an immediate danger.32 Such danger was absent in this case. The Chamber 
justified this approach by relying on Pontes v Portugal, where it was held that family ties 
could be severed in very exceptional circumstances, where the family is particularly unfit.33 
Yet not only did the social workers’ report show that the child was not in an immediate 
danger, but it additionally evidenced that the child was in a perfect environment and 
condition.  
One might also wonder whether the measures taken by the national authorities were 
deployed to set an example for couples planning to engage in similar unlawful (in Italy) 
reproductive methods, because, as spotted by the Joint Dissenting Opinion, the Italian courts 
did not consider whether it was in the child’s interest to remain with the family.34 
Finally, when striking a fair balance between the competing interests, it seems that the 
Italian courts did not seriously consider the interests of the applicants. While the Court 
constantly referred to the applicants’ unlawful conduct – conduct unlawful in Italy and not 
Russia, where the surrogacy took place – there is no mention of how this had an impact on 
the private life of the intended parents. It is hard to understand how the ECtHR found that a 
                                                            
31 ‘If subsequent evidence reveals that a final adoption order was based on fraudulent or misleading evidence, 
the interests of the child should remain paramount in establishing a process to deal with any damage caused to 
the adoptive parent as a result of the wrongful order’ Zaiet v Romania [2015] ECHR 307, [49]. 
32 Chamber’s Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (n 4) [80]. 
33 Pontes v Portugal ECtHR 10 Apr 2012, [79].  
34 Paradiso & Campanelli v Italy, Joint Dissenting Opinion (n 23) [12]. 
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fair balance was struck when there is no reference from the national authorities on the 
influence this judgment would have on the applicants.       
In relation to the impact this judgment will have on cross-border surrogacy, it is 
imperative to allude to the scepticism towards the judgments of the ECtHR related to this 
matter. The Court has had to adjudicate on the denial of civil registration of surrogate-born 
children twice (Mennesson, Labassee).35 These two cases have been severely criticised, 
because they ‘forced’ national authorities to register children born through surrogacy in 
another state, albeit prohibited at domestic level, based on the best interests of the child and 
the violation of the children’s right to respect for private and family life. This was perceived 
as a backdoor acceptance of surrogacy and as depriving states of the opportunity to decide 
whether or not to allow surrogacy, while creating a double standard, as, within the same state, 
domestic surrogacy is illegal, whereas cross-border surrogacy will be recognised.36 
Nonetheless, the Paradiso judgment will not change the previous rulings, which are 
indeed based on different circumstances. When it comes to intended parents with children 
biologically linked to them, born through surrogacy in another state, the national authorities 
should recognise this parentage and register the children in their home country, thus 
following Mennesson and Labassee. Paradiso only affects relations between non-biologically 
linked intended parents and children. Consequently, even where there is a prohibition of 
surrogacy at domestic level, the law can be circumvented through cross-border surrogacy and 
the parent-child relationship will have to be recognised by the domestic authorities, as long as 
there is a biological link between one of the intended parents and the child. This demonstrates 
that the strict approach taken by the Court might not have a great impact. The judgment 
might have served as a response to the criticism concerning the backdoor acceptance of 
                                                            
35 Mennesson v France, Labassee v France (n 1). 
36 P Beaumont and K Trimmings (n 5), 12. 
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surrogacy, but in reality, its effect might be insignificant and it certainly does not offer a 
solution to the problem of cross-border surrogacy. Thus, even the criticism that the Court 
forces states prohibiting surrogacy to accept cross-border surrogacy will not be resolved by 
this case, showing the need for the ECtHR to make an in-depth assessment of surrogacy. The 
Court has not considered the underlining moral and ethical issues and did not even 
distinguish between commercial and altruistic surrogacy, however vital. These will inevitably 
have to be addressed by the Court in the future. 
Conversely, a positive impact that this judgment might have is that it demonstrates the 
gravity of the cross-border surrogacy problem and its devastating implication for individuals’ 
lives, as is the separation of the intended parents and the children. This may provide further 
impetus for the Expert Group to progress on the Surrogacy/Parental Project, established by 
The Hague Conference.37 The aim of this project is to study surrogacy worldwide and 
provide guidance towards a binding multilateral instrument. This development in Private 
International Law will be extremely helpful, as surrogacy will be regulated at an international 
level and it will then be treated as such and not as a failed international adoption, like in the 
case at hand by the Italian Courts.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy is a problematic judgment for surrogacy. It takes a 
restrictive approach to the notion of de facto family life, by denying its existence when there 
is a combination of three factors: absence of biological ties, short duration of cohabitation 
and legal uncertainty created by the applicants themselves. Acknowledging the involvement 
of private life, the Court examined the legitimate interference imposed by the Italian 
                                                            
37 For further information, < https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy>. 
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authorities. The ECtHR found no violation of Article 8, given that the interference was in 
accordance with Italian laws, the interference served the legitimate aim of ensuring the 
prevention of disorder and protecting the child’s rights and freedoms and was necessary in a 
democratic society, due to the wide margin of appreciation given to Italy and its compliance 
with the requirement of a fair balance between the competing interests. 
The differences among the judgments in the case displays a deep division on 
surrogacy within the ECtHR. The ECtHR has the unenviable task of deciding whether and 
how cross-border surrogacy operates in Europe. Fears concerning the adverse outcome of 
recognising commercial surrogacy in Europe are not, by themselves, enough to support 
denying that the forced separation violated respect for the intended parent’s private and 
family life. The denial of the involvement of family life, even when there is cohabitation of 
eight months from the early life of the child, and the justification of the interference, when 
there is no trace of estimation of the applicants’ interests with no indications that the 
separation serves the best interests of the child, generate doubts and objections. Reliance on 
what seems to be a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate families is alarming. The 
Court’s task is exceptionally difficult when dealing with these aspects of private and family 
life, especially in an era of massive advances in reproductive technology. Nonetheless, a 
judgment holding there to be no violation of the right to respect for private and family life 
should be grounded on solid argumentation.      
